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RECONSIDERING VIRGINIA JUDICIAL SELECTION
Carl W. Tobias *
The 2008 Virginia General Assembly adjourned this summer
without electing judges to vacancies on the State Corporation
Commission (the "Commission" or "SCC"), the Supreme Court of
Virginia, and numerous circuit courts. Thus, Democratic Gover-
nor Tim Kaine recently appointed practicing lawyer and former
SCC counsel James Dimitri to the Commission, Court of Appeals
of Virginia Judge LeRoy Millette to the supreme court, Chester-
field Circuit Judge Cleo Powell to the opening created by Judge
Millette's elevation, and numerous attorneys as circuit court
judges. Although the jurists whom the Governor appointed seem
very well-qualified, the judges may only serve for five months, un-
less the 2009 General Assembly elects them. The 2008 Assembly's
failure to elect judges for these vacancies demonstrates that the
selection process is ineffective, and perhaps broken, as this devel-
opment has eroded the delivery of justice and may have under-
mined public respect for judicial selection. The process for choos-
ing judges, therefore, deserves reassessment to ascertain whether
the system merits reform. This piece undertakes that effort.
This article first evaluates the origins and development of Vir-
ginia's procedure for appointing judges. This analysis determines
that Virginia and South Carolina are the only jurisdictions that
currently select judges through a process of legislative election.
The examination also discerns that the Old Dominion has em-
ployed this system throughout most of its history since the Amer-
ican Revolution. The regime concomitantly operated rather effica-
ciously for much of the time when one major political party
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controlled the governorship and both houses of the General As-
sembly. Moreover, the review finds that legislators and additional
observers have articulated, evaluated, and discussed various sug-
gestions for change over the years and that the Assembly has re-
cently instituted or experimented with some, but it has perma-
nently adopted very few.
The second section assesses recent developments which impli-
cate judicial selection in the Old Dominion. The section finds that
increasing partisanship and divisiveness have attended the
process for choosing judges, especially with the rise and growth of
a real two-party system as well as divided government in Virgin-
ia. The portion shows how the experience in the 2008 General As-
sembly-which failed in one regular and two special sessions to
elect judges for numerous vacancies, despite a plethora of oppor-
tunities to name the jurists-suggests that the system is ineffec-
tive, if not beyond remediation.
The final section, accordingly, explores numerous recommenda-
tions for future treatment of judicial selection in Virginia. This
part descriptively evaluates the benefits afforded and disadvan-
tages imposed by the processes that many other states employ
when choosing members of the bench. The section concludes by
proffering a number of solutions which appear to hold the great-
est promise for improving Virginia judicial selection.
I. THE HISTORY OF VIRGINIA JUDICIAL SELECTION
The origins and development of judicial selection in the Old
Dominion might seem to warrant relatively little exploration in
this paper, as that background has been treated elsewhere.1 Non-
etheless, considerable analysis is appropriate because this ex-
amination should inform appreciation of the problems that arose
historically when naming judges, of the recent complications, and
of possible remedies for those difficulties.
1. See, e.g., THOMAS R. MORRIS, THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT: AN INSTITUTIONAL
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1975); W. Hamilton Bryson, Judicial Independence in Virginia,
38 U. RICH. L. REV. 705 (2004); J. Amy Dillard, Separate and Obedient: The Judicial Qua-
lification Missing from the Job Description, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (2007); Alex B. Long, An
Historical Perspective on Judicial Selection Methods in Virginia and West Virginia, 18 J.L.
& POL. 691, 730-66 (2002).
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Throughout much of Virginia's history, the Commonwealth has
essentially followed the judicial selection regime that the state
presently employs. 2 This system provides for the General Assem-
bly to elect judges unless a vacancy occurs when the legislature is
not in session or the Assembly adjourns without electing judges to
openings. 3 In those circumstances, the Governor appoints the
judge, who serves until the next legislative session at which time
the Assembly may either elect the gubernatorial appointee or
someone else. 4
Virginia and South Carolina are the only jurisdictions in the
United States that authorize their legislatures to elect judges.5 A
substantial number of jurisdictions employ some form of popular
election, although certain states prescribe initial gubernatorial
appointment with subsequent retention elections. 6 Moreover, a
significant number of jurisdictions rely on several types of merit
selection commissions, which recommend multiple prospects to
the Governor, who appoints from that group. 7 A few states em-
ploy selection regimes that resemble the federal system because
the jurisdictions have gubernatorial nomination with legislative
advice and consent.8
2. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. For analyses that emphasize the earlier history, see
Bryson, supra note 1; Long, supra note 1. For analysis that emphasizes the recent history,
see Dillard, supra note 1. See generally 2 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 739-46 (1974).
3. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
4. See id.
5. See supra note 2; S.C. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 9, 14. For analysis of South Carolina,
see Martin Scott Driggers, Jr., South Carolina's Experiment: Legislative Control of Judi-
cial Merit Selection, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1217 (1998); Kimberly C. Petillo, Note, The Untou-
chables: The Impact of South Carolina's New Judicial Selection System on the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court, 1997-2003, 67 ALB. L. REV. 937 (2003).
6. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judi-
cial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 277
(2002); Long, supra note 1, at 702-03; LARRY C. BERKSON, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y,
JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT 2-3, http://www.ajs.
org/selectionldocs/Berkson.pdf. See generally ABA, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE
ABA COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY (2003), http://www.abanet.org/jud
indljeopardy/pdflreport.pdf.
7. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 301-02; Long, supra note 1, at 702;
BERKSON, supra note 6, at 2-3. A commission advises the South Carolina General Assem-
bly. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-19-10 to -20 (2005). Somewhat analogous panels have been
used in the federal system. See generally LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES
AND CANDIDATES (1980); ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING
COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1981).
8. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 300-01; Long, supra note 1, at 702;
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At various historical junctures, the Commonwealth has relied
upon elements of several regimes canvassed in the paragraph
immediately above. The first Constitution of Virginia in 1776
provided for the General Assembly to elect appellate judges, who
would "continue in office during good behaviour," thus essentially
instituting life tenure, an important constituent of the federal
system. 9 The 1851 Virginia Constitution replaced legislative elec-
tion with election by the voting populace, while the document
substituted a term of years for the equivalent of life tenure.lO The
popular election of judges, however, proved to be relatively short-
lived, as the 1870 Constitution provided for General Assembly
election of all Virginia judges for a term of years with the possibil-
ity of reelection.11 The Commonwealth reinstituted the earlier
legislative election approach because General Assembly members
wanted to employ judgeships as political patronage. 12
This system has basically remained intact since 1870.13 Article
VI, section 7 of the Constitution of Virginia provides that su-
preme court justices and "judges of all other courts of record shall
be chosen by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each
house of the General Assembly" with justices serving twelve-year
terms and all other judges serving for eight years. 14 The constitu-
tion also states that, if a judicial vacancy occurs "while the Gen-
eral Assembly is not in session, the Governor may appoint a suc-
cessor to serve until thirty days after the commencement of the
BERKSON, supra note 6, at 2-3; see also U.S. CONST. arts. II, III.
9. See VA. CONST. of 1776 art. XIV; see also U.S. CONST. art. III; VA. CONST. of 1830
art. V, § 1; Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 300; Bryson, supra note 1, at 711.
10. See VA. CONST. of 1851 art. VI, §§ 6, 10, 27, 34; see also Bryson, supra note 1, at
711. "The rejected 1861 Constitution, Art. VI, § 5, would have returned to the 1830 Consti-
tution's principle of tenure in office during good behavior after appointment.
HOWARD, supra note 2, at 741 n.5.
11. See VA. CONST. of 1870 art. VI, §§ 5, 11, 13, 14; see also Bryson, supra note 1, at
712; Long, supra note 1, at 751; supra notes 6, 9, 10 and accompanying text.
12. See JACK P. MADDEX, JR., THE VIRGINIA CONSERVATIVES 1867-1879: A STUDY IN
RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 92-93 (1970); see also Bryson, supra note 1, at 712.
13. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; VA. CONST. of 1902 art. VI, §§ 91, 96, 99; see also
HOWARD, supra note 2, at 739-46. See generally Bryson, supra note 1, at 712.
14. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. The Constitution of Virginia was last revised in 1971. See
id. 'The Commission on Constitutional Revision considered alternative plans," including
most that were analyzed supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text, but it "saw no advantage
to those plans over the method of judicial selection in Virginia." HOWARD, supra note 2, at




[Assembly's] next session... [and,] [u]pon election by the General
Assembly," a new jurist shall commence serving a full term. 15
The selection process has generally functioned efficaciously
when one of the principal parties controlled the Governor's Man-
sion and both houses of the General Assembly, as was true for
most of the time since the regime's 1870 adoption.16 The proce-
dure for choosing judges has operated less smoothly over the past
few decades with the rise and expansion of the modern Virginia
Republican party and the corresponding phenomenon of divided
government in which the Governor has been a member of one
party and the other party has possessed a majority in either the
Senate or the House of Delegates.17 For much of the period when
Democrats controlled the governorship and both General Assem-
bly houses, Republican senators and delegates had relatively lit-
tle input on the choice of judges. Thus, it should not have been
surprising that once Republicans secured control of the Gover-
nor's Mansion as well as the Senate and the House, Democratic
legislators would contribute minimally to judicial selection.
Over the last dozen years, relations between Virginia Demo-
crats and Republicans in the General Assembly have been con-
tentious, a phenomenon witnessed most relevantly in the gradual
deterioration of the judicial selection process. For example, in
1996, the Assembly failed to fill thirty percent of the openings be-
cause of partisan infighting, which allowed Republican Governor
George Allen to appoint judges for these vacancies once the legis-
lature adjourned.1S The next year, Democrats and Republicans
vehemently disagreed over the election of someone to fill the su-
preme court vacancy created by Justice Roscoe Stephenson's re-
tirement; the controversy terminated in a stalemate, thus permit-
15. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. If the Assembly adjourns without filling vacancies, as
happened in 2008, the Governor may appoint judges to those openings. See id.
16. Professor Bryson found one major historical exception in the 1870s and 1880s,
which he believes posed a threat to judicial independence; the situation, however, pre-
vailed for a rather short time. See Bryson, supra note 1, at 708-12. See generally
MARGARET VIRGINIA NELSON, A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN VIRGINIA, 1789-1928, at
110-20 (1947).
17. For somewhat analogous developments at the federal level, see BENJAMIN WITrES,
CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES (2006); Carl
Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527
(1998).
18. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 10; see also Ross MacKenzie, Editorial, On the Grow-
ing Partisanization of the General Assembly, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 19, 1997, at F7.
20081
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ting Governor Allen to appoint the replacement.19 In 1998, the
parties engaged in a "nine-hour standoff," which left thirty judge-
ships unfilled, although legislators eventually agreed to elect
judges for practically all of the openings. 20
Once the Republican party captured the governorship and the
General Assembly, Republicans predictably limited Democratic
input in judicial appointments, but Republican Senate and House
members also instituted certain measures that modified the se-
lection process. In 1998, Assembly Republicans and Democrats
began considering the establishment of an informal Joint Judicial
Advisory Committee that would screen supreme court and court
of appeals candidates.21 The fourteen-member Advisory Commit-
tee, comprised of numerous former Republican and Democratic
leaders, secured background information, financial disclosure re-
ports, and writing samples from candidates and solicited input
from state and local bar associations. 22 Civic organizations and
citizens then interviewed the prospective judges and submitted
recommendations to the Assembly for vacancies on the two appel-
late courts.23 In 2000, a joint resolution of both General Assembly
houses concomitantly requested that the supreme court formulate
evaluation criteria to assist the Assembly in electing judges.24
Notwithstanding these modifications, the selection process has
grown increasingly controversial. Certain observers voiced con-
cern that the program for assessing candidates might threaten
19. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 11; Long, supra note 1, at 696-97.
20. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 12; Pamela Stallsmith, 10 Judges Elected; 1 Spot
Open, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 1998, at As.
21. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 12-14; Long, supra note 1, at 697; Margaret Edds,
Op-Ed., Picking Judges: You Can't Take Rice out of Rice Pudding, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar.
5, 2000, at J5.
22. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 13-14; Long, supra note 1, at 697; Edds, supra note
21; Ruth S. Intress, Republicans Present 14 Finalists for Judgeships, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 23, 2000, at A8.
23. See Long, supra note 1, at 697. In 2000, Republican Assembly members also estab-
lished local citizen committees in some localities that would complement suggestions of
local bar associations. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 13; Long, supra note 1, at 697; GOP
Forms Judges Panel, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 11, 2000, at B4; see also Carl Tobias,
Senators Worked Together To Fill the 4th Circuit, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, July 15, 2007, at
El (analyzing a somewhat analogous federal entity).
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-100 (Cum. Supp. 2008); H.J. Res. 212, Va. Gen. Assem-
bly (Reg. Sess. 2000); Dillard, supra note 1, at 7; Long, supra note 1, at 697. "2009 is the
first year that judges up for reappointment will have had a sufficient number of perfor-
mance evaluations for legislators to review." Michelle Washington, Lawmakers To Get
Brief Shot at Filling Judicial Vacancies, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Apr. 21, 2008, at Al.
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judicial independence, 25 while others expressed concern that spe-
cific regions of Virginia were neglected or that Republicans domi-
nated the Advisory Committee's membership. 26 Indeed, the Re-
publican General Assembly refused to reelect certain judges
whom earlier Democratic Assemblies had elected.2 7 The gradual-
ly deteriorating interparty relations worsened in the 2008 Gener-
al Assembly session when the legislature was unable to elect
judges for more than a dozen vacancies, including openings on the
SCC and the supreme court. These developments are explored
next.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The 2008 General Assembly had the opportunity to elect two
Supreme Court of Virginia justices, two court of appeals judges,
and numerous circuit court judges. In fairness, Governor Kaine
had appointed Justice Bernard Goodwyn to the supreme court
and Judge Millette to the court of appeals when vacancies mate-
rialized after the 2007 Assembly session had adjourned. 28 Moreo-
ver, Justice Steven Agee did not officially resign from the su-
preme court until July 2008, while Judge Millette's court of
appeals seat only became vacant when Governor Kaine appointed
the jurist to the opening that Justice Agee's resignation created. 29
Nonetheless, Republicans initially withheld their support for Jus-
tice Goodwyn and Judge Millette, although the 2008 Assembly
eventually elected them.30 Moreover, President George W. Bush
25. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 18-29; Long, supra note 1, at 698; Matthew Dolan,
State Looks at Ways To Judge the Judges, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 29, 2001, at Al.
26. See Long, supra note 1, at 698; Edds, supra note 21; Laurence Hammack, Lawyer
Wins Judgeship on Merits of His Case, ROANOKE TIMES, May 30, 2000, at B1; see also
Washington, supra note 24.
27. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 18-29; Cindy Clayton & Matthew Dolan, Former
Deputy Prosecutor in Line for Norfolk Bench, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 20, 2001, at B1; Mi-
chael Sluss, Judge's Plight Sparks Debate, ROANOKE TIMES, Feb. 17, 2001, at Al; see also
supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
28. See Anita Kumar, Kaine Appoints Circuit Judge to Supreme Court, WASH. POST,
Oct. 11, 2007, at B6; Anita Kumar & Sandhya Somashekhar, Va. Senate Panel Rejects
Tax-Relief Plan That Passed Last Year, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2008, at B1; Jerry Markon,
Sniper Judge Is Named to Appeals Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2007, at B4.
29. See Jerry Markon, U.S. Appeals Court Gets New Judge, WASH. POST, July 31,
2008, at VAl; Neil H. Simon & Jeff E. Schapiro, Agee Wins OK from Senate, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, May 21, 2008, at B3.
30. See Kumar & Somashekhar, supra note 28; Jerry Markon, Sniper Judge Takes
Seat on Top Va. Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2008, at PW3 [hereinafter Markon, Sniper
Judge]; Jeff E. Schapiro, Kaine To Fill Judgeships Amid Lawmaker Gridlock, RICH.
208
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had nominated Justice Agee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in mid-March of 2008, to which the Senate con-
firmed the jurist in May; thus, the 2008 Assembly could rather
easily have anticipated and provided for the supreme court va-
cancy that Agee's elevation created.31
The 2008 Assembly had myriad opportunities to elect judges
because the Virginia Senate and House of Delegates convened in
one regular session and two special sessions. For example, nu-
merous media outlets reported that legislators had reached an
agreement regarding certain vacancies and even reported the
names of some prospects whom the Assembly was considering for
the openings. 32 The Democratic Senate and the Republican
House of Delegates, however, were ultimately unable to forge
consensus while Republicans in both chambers seemingly disa-
greed among themselves. 33
When a vacancy occurs while the General Assembly is not in
session, or when the Assembly adjourns without electing judges
to fill empty positions, the constitution assigns the Governor ap-
pointing responsibility. 34 Because Republicans have not commit-
ted to supporting Governor Kaine's choices, the well-qualified jur-
ists whom he appointed will serve five months without the
assurance that the 2009 Assembly will elect them.35 This uncer-
tainty presumably reduced the eligible candidate pool for these
crucial judicial offices. Although considerable prestige and busi-
ness-generating publicity may attend someone's short-term ap-
pointment to high level offices-such as SCC commissioner, su-
preme court justice, and court of appeals judge-numerous
qualified attorneys might be unwilling to disrupt their practices
TIMES-DISPATCH, July 11, 2008, at A5 [hereinafter Schapiro, Lawmaker Gridlock].
31. See Future Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary-l10th Congress, http://www.us
courts.gov/ctapps/webnovada/CF_FB_301/archived/futurevaclO001-08. (last visited Oct.
24, 2008); see also supra note 26.
32. See, e.g., Anita Kumar, Bickering in Va. General Assembly Leaves Judicial Posts
Open, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at C8; Jeff E. Schapiro, Lawmakers Approve Bond Bill,
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 2008, at Al; Julian Walker, Legislators Near Deal on Se-
lecting Judges, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 9, 2008, at B1.
33. See Schapiro, Lawmaker Gridlock, supra note 30; Julian Walker, Lawmakers Fail
To Reach a Deal on Naming Judges, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 10, 2008, at B3.
34. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; supra note 13 and accompanying text.




for possible election. 36 Sitting judges would be even less willing to
accept elevation and risk losing their judicial positions.
Even though Governor Kaine skillfully navigated the obstacles
described above, this judicial selection process is ineffective. A re-
gime that intrinsically shrinks the number of eligible candidates
and inherently allows protracted vacancies lacks efficacy. The
SCC operated for nine months absent one commissioner, impos-
ing pressure on the remaining two members and the Commission
staff. The supreme court similarly functioned over two months
with a vacancy. Both entities and the court of appeals will oper-
ate for five months with lingering uncertainty about the new ap-
pointees' tenure. The circuit courts have employed substitute
judges who are less familiar with the courts' procedures, tradi-
tions, and staff, which delays case resolution and reduces efficien-
cy. 37 These developments have impaired judicial operations, un-
dermining the delivery of justice and public respect.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Because Virginia's regime for appointing judges is apparently
less effective than it could be, the Commonwealth should evaluate
several ways to reform this system. The possible alterations may
be categorized into near-term, comparatively mundane devices,
which can usually be implemented by passing legislation, and
relatively dramatic techniques, most of which require constitu-
tional amendment.
A. A Short-Term Measure
One measure that the Old Dominion could adopt in the near
term is a merit selection commission that would recommend mul-
36. See Jeff E. Schapiro, Kaine Fills 2 Court Spots, One on SCC, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Aug. 16, 2008, at Al; Carl Tobias, Kaine Can Thread Judicial Needle, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, July 22, 2008, at A9; see also Editorial, Week's End, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, July 12, 2008, at A10.
37. See Julian Walker, Wheels of Justice Grind Slower over Shortage of Judges,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 4, 2008, at B1; see also Tobias, supra note 36. On October 7, 2008,
Governor Kaine announced the appointment of three judges to fill vacancies on the Circuit
Court for the City of Norfolk. Julian Walker & Michelle Washington, Kaine Appoints
Three to Norfolk Circuit Court, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 8, 2008, http://hamptonroads.com/
print/483226. The court had functioned for months without one-third of its nine judges,
and the court's clerk called the appointments "long overdue."' Id.
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tiple, excellent candidates whom the General Assembly in turn
could elect. 38 When evaluating the advisability of a panel, legisla-
tive members might want to consult the accumulated experience
of the states and the federal government, which have used ana-
logous entities. 39 The Assembly may correspondingly think about
issues such as commission composition, panel members' terms,
who should be the chair, whether the commission must submit a
minimum number of candidates, and whether the legislature may
reject the names tendered and request additional candidates.40
More specifically, this panel should be comprised of highly quali-
fied judges, legislators, attorneys, and citizens whom the Assem-
bly and the Governor appoint. The panel might also include seats
that are designated for specific interests, as is prescribed for cer-
tain Virginia agencies. 4 1
The idea warrants serious consideration because many of the
fifty jurisdictions and the federal government have successfully
deployed commissions principally to advise governors when ap-
pointing judges and presidents when submitting judicial nomi-
nees. 42 Virginia has employed a similar panel;43 observers criti-
cized the approach, however, arguing that the commission was
less balanced than it could have been and might have compro-
mised judicial independence.44 Thus, the Commonwealth should
ensure that the panel has diverse membership, especially vis-A-
vis political party affiliation, geography, race, and gender, and
has the requisite expertise, professionalism, and resources to
avoid threatening judicial independence.45
38. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. When the Governor exercises judicial
appointment power, the official should consider using a panel, although time restraints
might limit its efficacy.
39. See supra notes 7, 22-23 and accompanying text.
40. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 306; see also infra note 41 and accom-
panying text.
41. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1302 (Cum. Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-
102 (Repl. Vol. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.9 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
42. See supra notes 7, 22-23 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.




Virginia may also wish to consider longer-term, more dramatic
alterations that would replace General Assembly election with
various alternatives, although legislators might be understanda-
bly reluctant to relinquish the authority they currently possess to
elect judges. Perhaps the most promising option is gubernatorial
nomination, which many jurisdictions require to be premised on
merit selection panel recommendations with legislative advice
and consent.
This notion deserves careful analysis, as it provides safeguards
against gubernatorial overreaching through the merit selection
commission and Assembly rejection of nominees found unquali-
fied, thus preserving legislative authority and the balance of
power among the three branches. The idea mirrors the federal
system, which has operated rather efficaciously for more than two
centuries, although the federal approach has recently experienced
the same partisanship and divisiveness that have plagued the
Virginia Assembly's election of judges.46 Nonetheless, the concept
warrants exploration because the federal regime has generally
proven efficacious. The Governor and the legislature, therefore,
should attempt to increase bipartisanship to defuse the politiciza-
tion that has recently suffused Virginia judicial selection because
these efforts improve the process, safeguard judicial indepen-
dence, and enhance public respect for all three branches.47
The popular election of judges is another major alternative that
numerous states have long applied, even though the system is
less ubiquitous than it used to be.48 This scheme has obvious su-
perficial democratic appeal because the regime allows the people
to elect members of the bench directly. Many observers, however,
have articulated a growing number of, and increasingly persua-
sive, criticisms of judicial elections. For example, when judicial
candidates accept campaign contributions from lawyers and par-
ties who litigate cases before them, this creates the appearance of
impropriety, while judges' reliance on this money and political
46. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Christopher Peace, As Statesmen, GOP Should Confirm Governor's Pick
for SCC, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 7, 2008, at E4; Jeff E. Schapiro, Path to Naming
Judges Can Be Rocky, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 25, 2008, at B2. For additional support
for this measure, see Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 304; ABA, supra note 6, at
70-73.
48. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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party support threatens judicial independence.49 When candi-
dates assume positions on social or political issues, this analo-
gously undermines the perception of impartiality. 50 The lack of
instructive information conveyed in judicial campaigns concomi-
tantly leaves voters uninformed, while the distasteful rhetoric ex-
changed undercuts public confidence.51 Most of these factors dis-
suade numerous qualified attorneys from seeking judicial office.52
Therefore, the approach is not viable, and the Commonwealth
should eschew it.53
These longer-term reforms are comparatively far-reaching and
their institution would require amendment of the Constitution of
Virginia.54 Therefore, the Assembly may want to invoke the ve-
nerable study commission process, which legislators have long
employed to analyze a number of particularly difficult complica-
tions and formulate efficacious solutions. 55 A study commission
should comprehensively assess the dilemma that judicial selec-
tion currently presents, consider a broad spectrum of promising
solutions, and recommend various improvements which the
people of Virginia might concomitantly adopt through the consti-
tutional amendment process. 56
If the Commonwealth finds the longer-term reforms too drastic,
the General Assembly should at least seriously consider the
short-term merit selection panel idea broached above or create a
study commission to evaluate the notion. Should legislators nev-
ertheless reject both of these approaches, they must institute
49. I rely substantially here and in the remainder of this paragraph on Behrens &
Silverman, supra note 6, at 277-79; ABA, supra note 6.
50. See, e.g., Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 292-94; Mary Libby Payne, Mis-
sissippi Judicial Elections: A Problem Without a Solution? 67 MISS. L.J. 1, 9-25 (1997).
51. See, e.g., Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 290-91; Nathan S. Heffernan,
Judicial Responsibility, Judicial Independence and the Election of Judges, 80 MARQ. L.
REV. 1031, 1044-45 (1997).
52. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
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measures that will depoliticize the selection process and enhance
bipartisanship. 57
CONCLUSION
The 2008 Virginia General Assembly's failure to fill numerous
vacancies by electing judges has impeded judicial operations and
undercut public respect, while this development suggests that the
selection process is ineffective and merits remediation or ameli-
oration. Therefore, the Commonwealth should carefully explore
numerous alternatives which may improve the selection of
judges.
57. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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